UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ERNEST CALVINO JR.,

Plaintiff.

-against-

VIVIAN 37 ST.,

Defendant.

20-CV-0657 (CM)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff brings this action *pro se*. By order dated January 27, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, *in forma pauperis* ("IFP"). The Court dismisses this action for the reasons set forth below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, when the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original).

A claim is frivolous when it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), *abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*,

550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (holding that "a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible"); *Livingston*, 141 F.3d at 437 ("[A]n action is 'frivolous' when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . ; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, using the Court's general complaint form, brings this action invoking the Court's federal question jurisdiction. He claims that Defendant neglected to transfer his property and support him. Plaintiff asserts the following facts, verbatim:

She is one of my ter. party stack holders. The reason for this is because a Data breach and because, I don't have privacy right at the moment and in or around the time she was holding my valuebles, propertys, busnesses asset.

(ECF No. 2, 5 ¶ III.) Plaintiff seeks unspecified property and monetary damages.

DISCUSSION

Since December 17, 2019, Plaintiff has filed numerous frivolous actions in this Court. He continued to file frivolous complaints even after the Court warned him that further vexatious or frivolous litigation in this Court will result in an order barring him from filing new actions IFP unless he receives prior permission. *See, e.g., Calvino v. Jones*, ECF 1:19-CV-11601, 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2019). On January 10, 2020, the Court directed Plaintiff to show cause why he should not be barred from filing any further actions in this Court IFP without first obtaining permission from the Court to file his complaint. *See Calvino v. Fauto L.*, ECF 1:19-CV-11958, 4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2020).

Plaintiff filed this action after the Court directed him to show cause why he should not be barred. Even when read with the "special solicitude" due *pro se* pleadings, *Triestman*, 470 F.3d at 475, Plaintiff's claims rise to the level of the irrational, and there is no legal theory on which he

can rely. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 33; Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437. This action is a continuation of

Plaintiff's pattern of frivolous and vexatious litigation.

District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to

cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

Because the defects in Plaintiff's complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the Court

declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend and dismisses this action as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

CONCLUSION

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on

the docket. The Court dismisses this action as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

Dated:

January 27, 2020

New York, New York

COLLEEN McMAHON

Chief United States District Judge

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